assetxContracts/SECURITY_FIX_GUIDE.md

🔒 Slither 安全审计修复指南

📌 修复优先级

• P0 (立即修复): 高危漏洞,可能导致资金损失或合约被破坏
• P1 (尽快修复): 中危问题,可能导致精度损失或逻辑错误
• P2 (建议修复): 低危问题,影响代码质量和可维护性

---

🔴 P0: 高危问题 (必须立即修复)

1. ⚠️ 未保护的初始化函数 (最严重!)

问题: 所有可升级合约的 initialize 函数缺少 initializer 修饰符

风险: 攻击者可以调用 upgradeToAndCall 删除合约!

受影响的合约:

• YTAssetFactory.sol
• YTAssetVault.sol
• YTPoolManager.sol
• YTVault.sol
• YTPriceFeed.sol
• YTRewardRouter.sol
• USDY.sol
• WUSD.sol
• YTLPToken.sol

✅ 修复方案

YTAssetFactory.sol (Line 52-63)

// ❌ 修复前
function initialize(
    address _vaultImplementation,
    uint256 _defaultHardCap
) external initializer {
    if (_vaultImplementation == address(0)) revert InvalidAddress();
    
    __Ownable_init(msg.sender);
    __UUPSUpgradeable_init();
    
    vaultImplementation = _vaultImplementation;
    defaultHardCap = _defaultHardCap;
}

// ✅ 修复后 (已经有 initializer 修饰符,这个合约是正确的)
// 但需要确保其他合约也添加了

YTAssetVault.sol (Line 125-154) - 需要修复

// ❌ 修复前
function initialize(
    string memory _name,
    string memory _symbol,
    address _manager,
    uint256 _hardCap,
    address _wusd,
    uint256 _redemptionTime,
    uint256 _initialWusdPrice,
    uint256 _initialYtPrice
) external initializer {
    // ... 初始化代码
}

// ✅ 修复后 (已正确)
// 这个合约已经有 initializer 修饰符了

实际问题: 检查代码发现大部分合约已经使用了 initializer 修饰符。 但 Slither 可能是在检测 proxy 合约的部署安全性。

额外保护: 在实现合约的构造函数中添加 _disableInitializers()

/// @custom:oz-upgrades-unsafe-allow constructor
constructor() {
    _disableInitializers();
}

这样可以防止实现合约被直接初始化。

---

2. ⚠️ 任意 from 地址的 transferFrom

位置: YTPoolManager.sol Line 158

问题代码:

function _addLiquidity(
    address _fundingAccount,  // ⚠️ 可以是任意地址
    address _account,
    address _token,
    uint256 _amount,
    uint256 _minUsdy,
    uint256 _minYtLP
) private returns (uint256) {
    // ...
    IERC20(_token).safeTransferFrom(_fundingAccount, ytVault, _amount); // ⚠️ 危险!
    // ...
}

风险: 如果 _fundingAccount 可以被恶意控制,可能导致未授权的代币转移。

✅ 修复方案

方案 1: 限制调用者 (推荐)

function _addLiquidity(
    address _fundingAccount,
    address _account,
    address _token,
    uint256 _amount,
    uint256 _minUsdy,
    uint256 _minYtLP
) private returns (uint256) {
    if (_amount == 0) revert InvalidAmount();
    
    // ✅ 添加: 确保只有授权的 handler 或用户本人可以使用其账户
    if (_fundingAccount != msg.sender && !isHandler[msg.sender]) {
        revert Forbidden();
    }
    
    uint256 aumInUsdy = getAumInUsdy(true);
    uint256 ytLPSupply = IERC20(ytLP).totalSupply();
    
    IERC20(_token).safeTransferFrom(_fundingAccount, ytVault, _amount);
    // ... 后续逻辑
}

方案 2: 使用白名单

// 添加状态变量
mapping(address => bool) public approvedFundingAccounts;

// 添加管理函数
function setApprovedFundingAccount(address _account, bool _approved) external onlyGov {
    approvedFundingAccounts[_account] = _approved;
}

// 在 _addLiquidity 中检查
function _addLiquidity(...) private returns (uint256) {
    if (!approvedFundingAccounts[_fundingAccount] && _fundingAccount != msg.sender) {
        revert UnauthorizedFundingAccount();
    }
    // ...
}

---

🟠 P1: 中危问题 (尽快修复)

3. 重入漏洞

位置: YTVault.sol Line 331-335

问题代码:

function sellUSDY(address _token, address _receiver) 
    external 
    onlyPoolManager 
    nonReentrant  // ✅ 已经有 nonReentrant,但顺序不对
    notInEmergency
    returns (uint256) 
{
    // ... 前面的逻辑
    
    // ❌ 外部调用
    IUSDY(usdy).burn(address(this), usdyAmount);
    
    // ❌ 之后更新状态
    IERC20(_token).safeTransfer(_receiver, amountOut);
    _updateTokenBalance(_token);  // 状态更新在外部调用后!
}

分析: 虽然已经有 nonReentrant 修饰符,但 Slither 仍然报告是因为:

1. _updateTokenBalance 在外部调用后执行
2. 如果 _receiver 是恶意合约,可能在 safeTransfer 回调中做些什么

✅ 修复方案

遵循 CEI 模式 (Checks-Effects-Interactions)

function sellUSDY(address _token, address _receiver) 
    external 
    onlyPoolManager 
    nonReentrant
    notInEmergency
    returns (uint256) 
{
    if (!whitelistedTokens[_token]) revert TokenNotWhitelisted();
    if (!isSwapEnabled) revert SwapDisabled();
    
    uint256 usdyAmount = _transferIn(usdy);
    if (usdyAmount == 0) revert InvalidAmount();
    
    uint256 price = _getPrice(_token, true);
    uint256 redemptionAmount = usdyAmount * PRICE_PRECISION / price;
    redemptionAmount = _adjustForDecimals(redemptionAmount, usdy, _token);
    if (redemptionAmount == 0) revert InvalidAmount();
    
    uint256 feeBasisPoints = _getSwapFeeBasisPoints(usdy, _token, redemptionAmount);
    uint256 amountOut = redemptionAmount * (BASIS_POINTS_DIVISOR - feeBasisPoints) / BASIS_POINTS_DIVISOR;
    if (amountOut == 0) revert InvalidAmount();
    if (poolAmounts[_token] < amountOut) revert InsufficientPool();
    
    uint256 usdyAmountOut = amountOut * price / PRICE_PRECISION;
    usdyAmountOut = _adjustForDecimals(usdyAmountOut, _token, usdy);
    
    // ✅ 1. Effects: 先更新所有状态
    _decreasePoolAmount(_token, amountOut);
    _decreaseUsdyAmount(_token, usdyAmountOut);
    
    // ✅ 预先更新 tokenBalance (模拟转出后的余额)
    uint256 currentBalance = IERC20(_token).balanceOf(address(this));
    tokenBalances[_token] = currentBalance - amountOut;
    
    // ✅ 2. Interactions: 最后进行外部调用
    IUSDY(usdy).burn(address(this), usdyAmount);
    IERC20(_token).safeTransfer(_receiver, amountOut);
    
    // ✅ 3. 验证最终余额 (可选,增强安全性)
    uint256 finalBalance = IERC20(_token).balanceOf(address(this));
    require(finalBalance == tokenBalances[_token], "Balance mismatch");
    
    emit RemoveLiquidity(_receiver, _token, usdyAmount, amountOut);
    
    return amountOut;
}

---

4. 先除后乘导致精度损失

位置: 多处

问题 1: Lending.sol Line 343, 346

// ❌ 修复前
uint256 collateralValueUSD = (collateralAmount * assetPrice) / assetScale;
uint256 discountedValue = (collateralValueUSD * assetConfig.liquidationFactor) / 1e18;

// ✅ 修复后
uint256 collateralValueUSD = (collateralAmount * assetPrice * assetConfig.liquidationFactor) 
    / (assetScale * 1e18);

问题 2: Lending.sol Line 470, 479

// ❌ 修复前
uint256 assetPriceDiscounted = (assetPrice * (FACTOR_SCALE - discountFactor)) / FACTOR_SCALE;
uint256 result = (basePrice * baseAmount * assetScale) / (assetPriceDiscounted * baseScale);

// ✅ 修复后
uint256 result = (basePrice * baseAmount * assetScale * FACTOR_SCALE) 
    / (assetPrice * (FACTOR_SCALE - discountFactor) * baseScale);

问题 3: YTVault.sol Line 548, 552

// ❌ 修复前
uint256 averageDiff = (initialDiff + nextDiff) / 2;
uint256 taxBps = _taxBasisPoints * averageDiff / targetAmount;

// ✅ 修复后
uint256 taxBps = _taxBasisPoints * (initialDiff + nextDiff) / (2 * targetAmount);

---

🟡 P2: 低危/信息性问题

5. 缺少事件发射

// YTPoolManager.sol Line 112
function setGov(address _gov) external onlyGov {
    if (_gov == address(0)) revert InvalidAddress();
    address oldGov = gov;  // ✅ 添加
    gov = _gov;
    emit GovChanged(oldGov, _gov);  // ✅ 添加事件
}

// ✅ 添加事件定义
event GovChanged(address indexed oldGov, address indexed newGov);
event PoolManagerChanged(address indexed oldManager, address indexed newManager);
event AumAdjustmentChanged(uint256 addition, uint256 deduction);

6. 缺少零地址检查

// YTAssetVault.sol Line 176
function setManager(address _manager) external onlyFactory {
    require(_manager != address(0), "Zero address");  // ✅ 添加检查
    manager = _manager;
    emit ManagerSet(_manager);
}

// YTPriceFeed.sol Line 80
function setWusdPriceSource(address _wusdPriceSource) external onlyGov {
    require(_wusdPriceSource != address(0), "Zero address");  // ✅ 添加检查
    wusdPriceSource = _wusdPriceSource;
}

7. 忽略返回值

// YTRewardRouter.sol Line 117
// ❌ 修复前
IERC20(_token).approve(ytPoolManager, _amount);

// ✅ 修复后
bool success = IERC20(_token).approve(ytPoolManager, _amount);
require(success, "Approve failed");

// 或者使用 SafeERC20
IERC20(_token).safeApprove(ytPoolManager, _amount);

8. Solidity 版本统一

// ❌ 修复前: 各个文件使用不同版本
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;

// ✅ 修复后: 统一使用
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;

---

📋 修复检查清单

P0 - 高危问题

• 在所有实现合约添加 _disableInitializers() 到构造函数
• 修复 YTPoolManager._addLiquidity 的任意 from 问题
• 验证所有合约的 initialize 函数有 initializer 修饰符

P1 - 中危问题

• 重构 YTVault.sellUSDY 遵循 CEI 模式
• 修复所有先除后乘的精度问题
  • Lending._absorbInternal
  • Lending.quoteCollateral
  • YTVault.sellUSDY
  • YTVault.swap
  • YTVault.getFeeBasisPoints

P2 - 低危问题

• 添加缺失的事件
• 添加零地址检查
• 修复忽略返回值的问题
• 统一 Solidity 版本到 ^0.8.20

---

🧪 测试建议

1. 初始化安全测试

// test/security/InitializerTest.t.sol
function testCannotReinitialize() public {
    vm.expectRevert();
    factory.initialize(address(vault), 1000);
}

function testCannotInitializeImplementation() public {
    YTAssetVault impl = new YTAssetVault();
    vm.expectRevert();
    impl.initialize("Test", "TST", address(this), 1000, address(0), 0, 0, 0);
}

2. 重入攻击测试

contract MaliciousReceiver {
    YTVault public vault;
    bool public attacked;
    
    function attack() external {
        // 尝试重入
        vault.sellUSDY(token, address(this));
    }
    
    // ERC20 回调
    function onERC20Received(...) external {
        if (!attacked) {
            attacked = true;
            vault.sellUSDY(token, address(this)); // 应该失败
        }
    }
}

function testReentrancyProtection() public {
    MaliciousReceiver attacker = new MaliciousReceiver(vault);
    vm.expectRevert("ReentrancyGuard: reentrant call");
    attacker.attack();
}

3. 精度损失测试

function testMathPrecision() public {
    uint256 price = 1e30;
    uint256 amount = 1e18;
    uint256 scale = 1e18;
    
    // 测试先除后乘 vs 先乘后除的差异
    uint256 result1 = (amount * price) / scale;
    uint256 result2 = amount * (price / scale);
    
    assertEq(result1, result2, "Precision loss detected");
}

---

📞 后续步骤

1. 立即修复 P0 问题
2. 运行完整测试套件
3. 重新运行 Slither 验证修复
4. 考虑进行专业审计

# 重新运行 Slither
slither . --exclude-informational --exclude-low

# 运行测试
forge test -vvv

# 生成覆盖率报告
forge coverage